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LABOR LAw-CoNsTITUTIONAL LAw-DUB PaoCEss OP LAw-STATn PoWE:a
TO ENJOIN PBACBPUL PXCKBTINc--Plaintiff was a wholesale ice distributor, selling

ice to independent contractors. Defendants were ·members and officers of a union
which represented many of the truck drivers employed by these peddlers. In
carrying out a scheme to unionize all peddlers, defendants attempted to obtain
plaintiff's agreement not to sell ice to non-union peddlers. Such an agreement
would violate the state anti-trust law.1 On plaintiff's refusal, defendants peacefully picketed its plant. Plaintiff immediately ·suffered an 85% loss of business,
and the state court granted it an injunction against the picketing.2 On appeal to
the Supreme Court of the United States, held, affirmed. A state court may enjoin
picketing which has as its principal object the violation of a v~d state statute.
Giboney 11. Empire Storage Sr Ice Co. (U.S. 1949) 69 S.Ct. 684.
Ever since 'fhornhill 11. Alabama3 held that peaceful picketing was sufficiently
akin to free speech to invoke the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Supreme Court has bad difficulty in determining the scope of this doctrine.4 The
Court has always pmported to recognize that picketing has a duel nature as
speech and economic warfare. 5 It is the latter element which allows it to be regu-

Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1939) §§8301, 8305.
357 Mo. 671, 210 S.W. (2d) 55 (1948).
s 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940). See generally, Armstrong, ''Where Are We Going
With Picketing'?" 36 CALIF, L. RBv. I (1948); Teller, ''Picketing and Free Speech," 56
HAllv. L. RBv. 180 (1942); Dodd, "Picketing and Free Speech~ A Dissent," 56 HARv. L.
REv. 513 (1943); Teller, ''Picketing and Free Speech: A Reply," 56 HARv. L. REv. 532
1

2

(1943).
4 Shortly after Thombill v. Alabama, the Court decicled that a state could prolu'bit picketing outside the "area o£ the industry within which a labor dispute arises••••" CarpenteEs &
Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 at 728, 62 S.Ct. 807 (1942). Within two years
the Court unanimously upheld the right to picket a business even though it was conducted
without the aid of any employees o£ the business. The Court said the defendants had a right
to picket "regardless of the area of immunity as defined by state policy." Cafeteria Employees
Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 at 295, 64 S.Ct. 126 (1943). The Ritter's Cafe case was
not cited.
5 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552
(1941); Carpenters & Joiners Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722, 62 S.Ct. 807 (1942);
Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl,· 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816 (1942).
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lated to an extent not permissible in the case of more orthodox forms of free speech.
The principal case decides, for the first time, that peaceful picketing for an unlawful. objective may be enjoined. The decision rests squarely on the assumption
that the union was exercising something more 'than free speech; it was using
economic power to compel a result. To the Court the basic problem seemed to
be "whether Missouri or a labor union has paramount constitutional power to
regulate and govern the manner in which certain trade practices shall be carried
on. . • ."6 With this surprisingly new approach, the conclusion was foregone.
Since the anti-trust law regulated economic affairs, the Court defers to the legislative determination that the statute was a rational means of accomplishing the
proper legislative object.7 As the only purpose of the picketing was to compel violations of a valid statute, it was enjoinable, the basis for sustaining the injunction
being the "clear danger, imminent and immediate"8 that unless granted, the union
would be controlling state policy.9 On its facts the decision presents a striking
contrast to Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 10 which unanimously held picketing
immune from state prohibition. One explanation for the seemingly inconsistent
results may be that in the Wohl case the picketing violated no statute. At most
only state common law policy was violated,11 and the Court does not defer
to judicially determined policy as it does to that announced by the legislature.12
Moreover, in the Wohl case the picketing had no effect on the business picketed,
whereas in the principal case it all but ruined plaintiff's business. Adoption of the
latter as a basis of distinction would mean that only unsuccessful picketing is con-

6 Principal

case at 691.
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505 (1934).
s Principal case at 691.
9 Although it is conceivable that plaintifl: might continue to ignore the union's demands
and allow its business to be ruined, such a course was unlikely, since all other wholesalers in
the community had already acceded to the union's wishes and were violating the anti-trust
law. Principal case at 685.
10 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816 (1942).
11 The majority stated in the Wohl case that i£ the object were unlawful, perhaps
the injunction would be justified. However, the Court did not think the New York courts
had made it clear that the object was unlawful. 315 U.S. 769 at 774, 62 S.Ct. 816 (1942).
The Supreme Court apparently thought the only reason New York had granted the injunction was because there was no ''labor dispute," as defined by the state anti-injunction statute.
Cf. Opera on Tour, Inc. v. Weber, 285 N.Y. 348, 34 N.E. (2d) 349 (1941).
12 Duplex Printing Co. v. peering, 254 U.S. 443 at 488, 41 S.Ct. 172 (1921); A.F. of
L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568 (1941). In this respect, perhaps, the type of statute
involved in the Thornhill case should be distinguished from that in the principal case. The
Alabama statute was construed as forbidding all picketing near the scene of a labor dispute.
This might well have been held "unreasonable legislation," unconstitutional even under the
rule of Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505 (1934), without resorting to the
"clear and present danger" test that is invoked where civil liberties are concerned. The Court
conceded that a statute "narrowly drawn to cover the precise situation giving rise to thedanger" might be valid. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 at 105, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940). By
analogy, a "narrowly drawn" judge-made policy has also been upheld. Milk Wagon Drivers
Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 61 S.Ct. 552 (1941).
1 See
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stitutionally protected.13 The reason given in the Thornhill case for extending
the shelter of the Constitution to picketing was that the public might thereby become enlightened as to the facts concerning labor controversies. Unless the union
activity in the principal case could be interpreted as simply urging· the public to
change the present statute, this rationale cannot apply here. 14 However, the
unanimity of the decision weakens the Thornhill line of cases and may furnish
some comfort to state courts and legislatures which have honored the Thornhill
doctrine more in the breach than in the observance. 15

L.B. Lea, S. Ed.

13 Justices Douglas, Black and Murphy, concurring in Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl,
315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816 (1942).
In Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64 S.Ct. 126 (1943), the
injunctions were granted to prevent irreparable damages, yet the Supreme Court reversed the
judgments.
14 Defendants argued that since their "primary objective" was the improvement of labor
conditions, they had a constitutional right to violate the anti-trust laws. As the Court viewed
the question, the union was demanding greater constitutional immunities than accorded other
persons, and the union's contention was quickly refuted. In Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v.
Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 69 S.Ct. 251 (1949), the union contended
that union members had a constitutional right to work without non-union co-workers, but that
non-union workers had no comparable right. These "startling ideas" were similarly rejected.
Id. at 531.
15 Intl. Assn. Mach. v. Downtown Emp. Assn., (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) 204 S.W. (2d)
685; Silkworth v. Local 575, A.F.L., 309 Mich. 746, 16 N.W. (2d) 145 (1944); Fashioncraft v. Halpern, 313 Mass. 385, 48 N.E. (2d) 1 (1943); Retail Clerks' Union v. Wis. Emp.
Rel. Bd., 242 Wis. 21, 6 N.W. (2d) 698 (1942); Schwab v. Moving Picture Operators,
165 Ore. 602, 109 P. (2d) 600 (1941). Cf. Park & Tilford Corp. v. Intl. Bro. of Teamsters,
27 Cal. (2d) 599, 165 P. (2d) 891 (1946); Glover v. Minneapolis Bldg. Trades Council, 215
Minn. 533, 10 N.W. (2d) 481 (1943).

